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In the Cleveland Museum of Art hangs
a famous painting, The Burning of the
Houses of Parliament, by J.M.W. Turner.
The painting depicts an event that pro-
vides a fascinating case study of the diffi-
culty of changing payments systems in
the face of new technology. This diffi-
culty is surfacing again as modern
economies face the switch from paper-
based payments systems to a variety of
electronic systems. The Rivlin Commit-
tee called attention to the phenomenon in
its 1998 report when it observed that
“...the reliance on paper-based retail pay-
ment methods is striking in an electronic
age.”1 The report estimates that the per-
centage of paper makes up 78 percent of
all noncash transactions in the United
States and only 37 percent in Europe.
Why has the United States been so slow
to change? Much insight into the reason
can be gained by examining the events
surrounding the original adoption of
paper as a means of public record keep-
ing—events which led to the disastrous
fire depicted in Turner’s masterpiece.
This Economic Commentary explores
path dependence as a reason for the
choice in payment systems, as well as
for other economic phenomena. Path
dependence means that historical deci-
sions made in the remote past will often
determine the decisions made today. It is
related to the physical concept of hys-
teresis. Hysteresis refers to the failure of
a system to return to its original value
once the source of a change has been
removed. Thus, when you put pressure
on a bar beyond a certain point, it will
bend, and hysteresis will keep the bar
bent when you remove the pressure. The
bar’s shape reflects the historical pres-
sures that made it bend and will there-
fore show its path dependence. This
Economic Commentary will show how
path dependence and hysteresis work to
determine economic events, particularly
when network economies are in effect,
and will suggest that policy intervention
may be justified where hysteresis is
clearly at work. The Burning of the
Houses of Parliament represents an
event that illustrates the ability of net-
work economies to create a path depen-
dence in payment conventions.
Turner’s painting portrays an 1834 fire
which destroyed Britain’s historic Parlia-
ment buildings. Subsequent investigation
revealed the cause of the fire to be the
burning of a stockpile of old tally sticks.
Tallies were hazelwood sticks used in
Britain from the twelfth to the nineteenth
centuries to maintain tax accounts. Sticks
were notched to show the amount paid
and then split lengthwise so that both the
taxpayer and the Exchequer would have
a record of the payment. The larger
piece, called the stock, belonged to the
payer, and the smaller, the foil, was kept
by the government. When foils were no
longer needed, they were used for fuel
and burned in the fireplace of the tally
room at frequent intervals.
Although it was certainly clear by the
seventeenth century that paper was a
cheaper and far more efficient means of
record keeping, the tally system remained
in effect as the means of tax recording
until 1826, when it was formally abol-
ished. However, reluctance to accept the
new medium delayed the complete trans-
fer to paper for nearly a decade and
sowed the seeds of the fire. During the
transition to paper, tally sticks were used
as a backup, and old foils were allowed
to pile up.
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When Parliament finally decided to dis-
pose of the eight-year accumulation of
foils, the clerk assigned to the task
decided to burn them in the furnace of
the House of Lords. The fire burned in-
tensely and eventually grew out of con-
trol. (There is some evidence that the
workmen also enjoyed the “astonishing
blaze” created by the sticks and may not
have been as careful as they should have
been.2) By morning, the House of Lords,
the House of Commons, the Painted
Chamber, and a variety of other buildings
had been completely destroyed.
   Path Dependence
The use of tally sticks until 1826
reminds us that much of what we do
today is determined by what was done
yesterday or, indeed, by a minor decision
centuries ago. It is an example of what
economists term path dependence,
where the direction an economy takes at
a given point depends on a previously
chosen path. The path that an economy
initially follows may depend on seem-
ingly trivial considerations, or upon
technical details that might be very
important at the time of the choice but
are subsequently unimportant. Once the
path is chosen, however, it becomes dif-ficult to change—even when other con-
siderations indicate that the path is less
desirable relative to other alternatives.
For example, why would anyone live in
Chicago? Most people prefer to live in a
climate that is warm and sunny. Chicago
is windy and cold much of the year (but
hot in the summer) and dark and dreary
much of the time. Most people prefer
mountains or at least hills to provide
variation in their geography. Chicago is
flat. Yet Chicago is the third largest city
in the United States. Indeed, so many
people live in Chicago that the city’s
congestion provides another reason not
to live there.
Yet in the 1840s there were cogent rea-
sons for choosing Chicago as a place to
live and work. Anew canal had just
linked the Great Lakes watershed with
the Mississippi at Chicago. In addition,
the richest corn-growing land in the
world lay on the Illinois prairie. These
considerations were paramount at a time
when boats were the major carriers of an
agricultural nation’s produce. Later,
when railroads assumed this role, most
went through Chicago because the ware-
houses and grain elevators were there. In
the 1870s, when steel and other manu-
facturing overtook agriculture in the
nation’s output mix, much of this manu-
facturing was done in Chicago because
railroads and workers were there. 
Aperson today will rationally choose to
live in Chicago because of the rich
employment opportunities and family
ties that result from this history. Busi-
nesses start in Chicago because many
people making these rational choices
create a skilled labor force. Asocial
planner with perfect foresight might
have selected Boulder, Colorado, as a
better place to locate all of these people
today. However, the costs of changing
are too prohibitive, and people continue
to live in Chicago—all because of a
path chosen long ago. Path dependence
is a common economic tool in explain-
ing urban patterns.3
   Network Economies
Path dependence is thought to be most
endemic where there are networks. A
network is an economic interaction in
which one person’s participation creates
positive effects for other people partici-
pating. These positive effects are an
externality—where all the benefits of a
person’s action do not go to him alone
but also benefit other people in the net-
work. For example, the fact that a video
watcher uses the VHS format for video
tape creates a market for the owners of
VHS rental libraries, who expand their
collections to meet the needs of this mar-
ket. In turn, this benefits other con-
sumers of the VHS-formatted video
tape. The VHS format is not chosen
because it offers the clearer picture or
cheaper means of production. It is cho-
sen because of a minor historical inci-
dent: Matsushita was initially very
slightly more effective at selling VHS
players than Sony was with its better-
engineered Beta design. Network econ-
omies then made the VHS recorder the
chosen path. Network economies make
it difficult for an individual to change
until it is well understood that most of
the network will also make the change.
   Payment Conventions 
Perhaps the most obvious example of
network economies lies in payment
systems. When a new medium of ex-
change becomes available, enough peo-
ple must accept it, or it quickly becomes
worthless. Each person drawn into the
network (that is, they accept the me-
dium) enhances the medium’s value to
other members of the network. Because
the success of a new exchange medium
depends on quickly achieving a critical
mass of users, hysteresis is sometimes
observed in payment-system network
economies. It can often explain why
technically outmoded means of ex-
change are retained long after more effi-
cient methods could have been adopted.
For example, hysteresis is the likely
cause of the failure of “smart cards” to
catch on in the United States. Smart cards
look a lot like credit cards, but they are
distinguished from them in several im-
portant ways. Microchips are embedded
onto smart cards, enabling them to retain
and update account information, so debits
from the purchaser’s account are made
immediately. Credit cards require credit-
card providers to act as middlemen, bill-
ing the buyer and paying the merchant.
Of course, credit-card providers must
charge a high transaction fee (between 
1 and 2 percent of the value of the pur-
chase) to handle the exchange.4
Indeed, smart cards are more similar to
cash than credit cards. While smart
cards need not change monetary policy
(after all, they are backed by demand
deposits just like checks), they offer
many advantages over cash or checks.
Bookkeeping is much simpler because
each smart-card transaction creates an
entry in magnetic form for both the pur-
chaser and the seller. Carrying smart
cards—even with huge balances—is
much safer than carrying large amounts
of cash; smart-card microchips provide
a level of security that reduces the risk
of armed robbery and fraud.
Yet in the United States, people continue
to use other exchange media. In fact, the
use of cash has increased in recent years
at the expense of credit cards and checks.
Experiments in introducing smart cards
in Atlanta, St. Louis, and other places
have been fairly unsuccessful. In the
Atlanta trial, people were reluctant to use
smart cards, even when given a free bal-
ance to spend! The problem has been that
no purchaser benefits from using a smart
card until enough shops accept them, and
no shop is willing to invest in a machine
that will read smart cards until it attracts
enough sales from potential purchasers.
This contrasts with the situation in
France, where smart cards are rapidly
gaining acceptance (see figure 1). Inter-
estingly, this may be because other
exchange media have not penetrated the
French markets. In the United States
credit cards are widely used and widely
accepted, whereas in France this is not
the case. Thus, in France a shop may
invest in a smart-card reader knowing
that smart cards are more likely to be
used by its customers, who do not carry
credit cards. France, which has a poorer
exchange technology because of its dif-
ferent historical path, is more likely to
adopt the newer technology than the
United States.
The way payments are processed may
also have more to do with historical
process than with the most efficient cur-
rent technology. For example, many of
our payments are made by paper checks.
Checks, once deposited at the seller’s
bank, are then physically sent to the pur-
chaser’s bank. This involves a lot of
paper sorting and shipping. Figure 2
illustrates the increase in the total weight
of these checks in the last decade. Large
resources are required to move this con-
siderable weight of paper from city to
city each night. The process could easily
be accomplished by sending electronic
images of the checks by wire. Why is the
physical paper sent?
Again, network economies may be at
work. Checks are honored on the basis
of common laws dating from a time
when drafts were made on vellum. One
such law specifies that checks are ulti-
mately returned to the payer and have
legal standing as receipts. The networkhere is a social convention, with the
standing of common law. These con-
ventions are hard for an individual to
change, especially in light of a conserva-
tive legal system. They lead to methods
of handling payments that have more to
do with the historical context of the
eighteenth century, when much of the
law was adopted, than they have to do
with current technological capabilities.
The high cost of bouncing a check is
another example of network economies
and path dependence in action. A
bounced check must be sorted and
processed by hand. These checks could
be handled by machine if enough banks
were willing to mark bounced checks
with magnetic ink, so that they could 
be electronically sorted by check-
processing companies. Because not
enough banks are willing to do this, it
remains economically unfeasible for
check sorters to buy the machines that
read the ink. As a result, the path-
dependent convention in the United
States is to charge the bouncer of the
check the cost of hand sorting and
entering it.5
   Warnings and Conclusion
Policy may be especially effective when
applied to phenomena that exhibit hys-
teresis. To carry on the simple example at
the beginning of this Economic  Com-
mentary—that hysteresis represents the
tendency of an iron bar when bent to stay
bent—a role for policy may exist to
make a crooked bar straight. In the exam-
ples given here, it might be argued that
there is a role for a regulatory agency to
encourage the use of smart cards or the
use of a scanned image of a check rather
than the paper check itself. Path depen-
dence may explain an inefficiency in a
market or technological protocol that
could be corrected by an enlightened
policymaker or regulator. If a policy
recommendation is made, however, it is
important to apply a caveat to any use 
of hysteresis as an explanatory device 
in social science.
The observation of a prima facie irra-
tionality should never be taken as evi-
dence of hysteresis. It is very easy to
“explain” a behavior as a result of the
particular path the behavior took. This
explanation may obscure a more rational
motive that might be discovered with
further analysis. For example, the
QWERTYconfiguration of the keys on a
keyboard is often invoked as an example
of hysteresis. The configuration was
developed by Christopher Sholes, who,
after a little experimenting, discovered
that the QWERTYdesign seemed to
minimize two keys sticking on the prim-
itive typewriter. 
Is QWERTYclearly the result of a very
specific solution to a problem that is no
longer relevant? Dvorak and others have
thought so, and since the 1940s there
have been many competing designs
which optimize the keyboard according
to different, more relevant standards.
These keyboards, for example, place let-
ters that are used often in places where
they can be easily accessed by the strong
fingers, while relegating relatively
unused letters to weaker fingers. 
Champion typists often use the newer
keyboard configuration. Most typists,
however, stubbornly stick to the
QWERTYsystem. This is often viewed
as a technological example in which the
cost to change lies in the way that the
tradition of typing is passed on to the
next generation of typists. In spite of the
clear advantages offered by the new key
mappings and the ease with which the
configuration can be incorporated into a
personal computer (a public domain pro-
gram that does this has been offered
since the early days of the IBM PC),
people learn what their parents learn
when it comes to keyboarding.
But not so fast! All of the evidence is not
in. It turns out that ease of typing for the
vast majority of typists depends only
partly on whether an often-used letter is
associated with a strong finger. Minimiz-
ing the serial use of a finger is also
important. In other words, letters that
often come in pairs should be assigned
to different fingers to minimize typing
fatigue. When QWERTY-style key-
boards are matched on this broader crite-
rion, they do about as well as any design
and are far superior to the Dvorak-style
keyboards that seem such excellent
replacements. When viewed with respect
to this subtle ergonomic feature, the
decision to use QWERTYmay make
more sense as a rational response to our
needs today. Abandoning the search for a
cause based on current rational consider-
ations in favor of hysteresis obscures
this subtle but important observation. 
Nonetheless, path dependence is an
important tool in economic theory for
explaining the reasons cities continue in
their current form and network econo-
mies develop stickiness that makes them
hard to change. Some of this stickiness
may be evident in payment systems and
may help to explain why smart cards are
used in France and not in the United
States. The stickiness in payments sys-
tems, in particular, represents an impor-
tant policy phenomenon to understand.
Indeed, Humphrey, Kim, and Vale
(1998) estimate that payments impose a
social cost of only 0.5 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) in Norway,
compared to the United States, where
reliance on antiquated paper imposes
costs of 3.0 percent .6 Large costs were
similarly imposed when the Houses of
Parliament burned down as a result of a
payment convention that had been out-
moded for centuries.
The fire was not lost as a metaphor on
its contemporary observers. Many
shared the views of Carlyle that the fire
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Federal Reserve System.was just retribution for the venality of
Parliament.7  Of course, J.M.W. Turner
turned it into a visual metaphor for the
smallness of man in the face of disaster.
Years later, Victorians were still draw-
ing moral lessons from the disastrous
fire. In 1855 Charles Dickens, in a
speech to the Administrative Reform
Association, mentioned the accumula-
tion of tally sticks as an important ex-
ample that “all obstinate adherence to
rubbish, which time has long outlived,
is certain to have in the soul of it more
or less that is pernicious and destructive;
more or less that will some day set fire
to something or other; more or less,
which, freely given to the winds, would
have been harmless, which, persistently
retained, is ruinous.”8
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